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FINALITY VERSUS CONSISTENCY: DOES INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION NEED AN APPELLATE SYSTEM?
Ian Laird and Rebecca Askew*
I. INTRODUCTION
Investor-state arbitration is so new that the vast majority of
claims and decisions in this area have only occurred in the last
six or seven years, and many areas of the law and procedure
remain to be developed. The combination of international
commercial arbitration procedure I  and the substantive
obligations arising under public international law2 has created
* Ian Laird is an Attorney at Davis & Company LLP in Toronto, Canada. He can be
contacted at www.ianlaird.com. Mr. Laird has been extensively involved in international
investor-state arbitration and was counsel for S.D. Myers, Inc. The opinions expressed in
this article are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the views of Davis & Company
LLP or its clients. Rebecca Askew is a graduate of the J.D./LL.B Program at the University
of Detroit Mercy School of Law and the University of Windsor Law School in 2005 and is
presently completing her law articles in Ontario. This paper is based on a presentation
prepared with Frank Borowicz on this topic at the Canadian Bar Association-Fifth
Annual Commercial Arbitration Conference (Vancouver, June 27-28, 2005).
1. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), generally provide for arbitrations under the auspices of the
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) rules, or the United
Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. The
ICSID is an organ of the World Bank Group, while UNCITRAL is a Committee of the
United Nations. As such, both sets of rules enjoy high credibility.
2. The substantive obligations in BITs most often cited are those of (1)
expropriation-no expropriation or measures equivalent to expropriation are permitted
without compensation; (2) most-favored nation treatment and national treatment (as found
in NAFTA articles 1102 and 1 103)--discrimination is not permitted on the basis of
nationality. In particular, the best treatment provided to local companies, or third-country
investors, must also be provided to other foreign investors; and (3) fair and equitable
treatment (as included in NAFTA article 1 105)-regardless of the host state's domestic
law, the international law standard of treatment must be applied to all foreign investors. It
is a broad and widely accepted standard encompassing such fundamental standards as good
faith, due process, non-discrimination, and proportionality.
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many challenges for those interested in the development of this
new and fast-growing area of the law. Many of these challenges
relate to the application of fundamental principles of the
administration of justice. One such challenge is deciding
whether there is a need for an appellate mechanism in investor-
state arbitration.
There are over 2,200 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
in the world today.3 These international instruments provide
foreign investors with a direct means for redress against states
for breaches of international law obligations. This is referred to
as "investor-state arbitration."4 The provisions found in Chapter
11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are
a well-known example of this type of instrument. BITs, like the
provisions in NAFTA's Chapter 11, are not homogenous and
provide ample room for a diversity of tribunal opinions. With an
explosion of investor-state disputes and new decisions arising
from those arbitrations, concern has developed over whether
there are sufficient means to assure consistency and correctness
in the ad hoc arbitral process. This concern cuts to the heart of
what is clearly one of the fundamental features, and benefits, of
arbitration: finality. The debate divides scholars and
practitioners into two camps, one consisting of those who
believe it is more important to have an arbitration process that
provides finality, and one composed of those who advocate that
consistency and correctness in decisionmaking should be the
primary objective of the process.6
3. The number of BITs increased dramatically during the 1990s, resulting in a rise in
number from 385 in 1989 to a total of 2,265 in 2003. They now involve 176 countries.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNCTAD Analysis of
BITS. Also available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templatesiPage 1007.aspx (accessed
Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
4. In comparison with more traditional "state-to-state" arbitration involving the
espousal of investor claims by states.
5. North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican
States (Dec. 17, 1992), ch. 11, 32 ILM 612, 639-49 [hereinafter NAFTA]. A copy of the
NAFTA text can be accessed at http://www.naflaclaims.com/commission.htm (accessed
Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
6. This question was posed by Sir Eli Lauterpacht in his seminal work. See Eli
Lauterpacht, Aspects of the Administration of International Justice 110 (Cambridge U.
Press 1991).
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The drive towards an appellate mechanism is partly in
response to the fact that, in three recent cases, domestic courts in
Canada have been effectively asked to help in determining the
future viability of investor-state arbitration. In addition,
powerful political influences intent on preserving American
sovereignty have targeted investor-state arbitration as a threat,
thus helping to force the issue to the fore.
The substantive portion of this paper is divided into three
parts. The first two parts examine the main impetuses for a new
investor-state appellate mechanism, with Part II providing a
brief overview of the judicial review of NAFTA Chapter 11 in
the Canadian Courts, and Part III containing a discussion of the
push in the United States to add an appellate mechanism to the
investor-state arbitration process. Finally, Part IV explores some
of the key issues in the creation of a new appellate mechanism.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INVESTOR-STATE AWARDS
UNDER THE NAFTA
First, we look to NAFTA Chapter 11 as one of the key
elements of this unfolding drama. Under NAFTA, which is
procedurally based on the model of international commercial
arbitration, a judicial review of an arbitral award can be initiated
by a disputing party in the national courts of the place of
arbitration under the local law of that jurisdiction. Once review
is initiated in the national courts, the challenging party can seek
to vacate or annul the award.
In the early 1990s, the drafters of NAFTA Chapter 11, like
the drafters of other BITs, decided to adopt many elements of
the international commercial arbitration model into the
procedures of those arbitrations. This likely seemed a workable
and balanced model with the appropriate safeguards. It had the
benefits of adopting a well thought out system without the need
of creating a new process. It recognized the inherent flexibility
of arbitration and was consistent with the way these things had
been viewed with regard to other BITs. Under NAFTA Article
1120, claimants may choose from one of two basic sets of rules,
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the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 7  and the rules of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID). 8
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, originally designed for
commercial arbitration, are presently being used in a variety of
investor-state arbitrations. In international commercial
arbitration, as in much of investment arbitration, the only
permissible review is by a domestic court at the place of
arbitration. The standard of review under the UNCITRAL
Model Law Article 34(2), 9 which has been applied in Canada in
these judicial reviews, is limited to six grounds: (1) invalidity of
the agreement to arbitrate; (2) lack of notice to a party or other
inability to present the case; (3) inclusion in the award of
matters outside the scope of submission; (4) irregularity in the
composition of the tribunal or arbitral procedure; (5) non-
arbitrability of the subject-matter; and (6) violation of domestic
public policy. This type of challenge does not extend to the
7. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, GA Res. 31/98, U.N. UNCITRAL, 99th Plen. Mtg. (Dec.
15, 1976). Also available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules
/arb-rules.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
8. Under the NAFTA, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules are available to Canadian
and Mexican Claimants since their states are not signatories to the ICSID Convention,
whereas U.S. Claimants could conceivably avail themselves of the Convention itself. See
Convention On The Settlement Of Investment Disputes Between States And Nationals Of
Other States, ICSID/15/Rev. I (Jan. 2003), also available at http://www.worldbank.org
/icsid/basicdoc-archive/9.htm (accessed Jan. 25, 2006; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter ICSID Convention, but also known as the
Washington Convention]; the World Bank Group International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules (Intl. Ctr. for Settle. of
Inv. Disputes 2003), also available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc
.htm (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process). The Convention entered into force on October 14, 1966, when it had been ratified
by twenty countries. As of May 25, 2005, 142 countries have ratified the Convention to
become Contracting States. The World Bank Group International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, ICSID List of Contracting States, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid
/constate/c-states-en.htm (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
9. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, GA Res. 40/72,
112th Plen. Mtg. (Dec. 11, 1995), also available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english
/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/ml-arb-e.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. The UNCITRAL
Model Law has been adopted in its entirety into the Canadian Commercial Arbitration Act,
R.S., 1985, c. 17 (2d Supp.), also available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-34.6/35646.html
(accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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review of errors of law, or a review of the application of the
facts to the law. It is not an appellate style review.
The determination of the place of arbitration, or the lex loci
arbitri, thus becomes critical to the determination of judicial
review and enforcement. 10 If one is going to ask a domestic
court to review an international arbitral decision, the claimant in
particular wants to be sure that it will receive a fair hearing. Of
course, this adds an element of forum shopping."
The main exception in investment arbitrations is the
example of the ICSID Convention. The review process for
arbitrations under the ICSID Convention is an internal
annulment process pursuant to Article 52,12 but has similar
standards to that of a judicial review under the UNCITRAL
Model Law or New York Convention. 13 Disputes can go to
ICSID where arbitration is entirely removed from the domestic
court system. Whereas an appeal is concerned with the
substantive correctness of the decision and a court is permitted
to substitute its view, annulment voids a decision in whole or in
10. For a complete discussion of these issues, see Noah Rubins, Judicial Review of
Investment Arbitration Awards, in NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration: Past Issues,
Current Practice, Future Prospects 359 (Todd Weiler ed., Cameron May 2004).
11. The reason is that, typically, it is the Claimant in an investor-state arbitration that
chooses the arbitration rules under which the arbitration will operate. For example, see
NAFTA 1120.
12. ICSID Convention Regulations and Rules, supra n. 8. The permissible grounds for
annulment under Article 52 are (1) the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (2) the
Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; (3) there is corruption of a Tribunal member;
(4) there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; and (5) the
award does not state the reasons on which it is based. Id. at 26. Recent annulment awards
include Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4 (UK/Egypt BIT Feb. 5,
2002), also available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisionslWena-Egypt-
Annulment-5Feb2002.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process); and Compahia de Aguas del Aconquia S.A. & Vivendi Universal v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (France/Argentina BIT July 3, 2002), also available
at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Compania-Argentina-Annulment-
3 Jul 20 0 2
.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
13. UNCITRAL, United Nations Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (June 10, 1958), also available at http://www
.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-convXXiI_Ie.pdf. (accessed Nov. 17,
2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter New York
Convention]. The Convention is now in force in over 130 countries.
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part and sends the case back to a new tribunal for a new
decision.14
Underlying the judicial review and annulment processes is
implicit support for the concept of finality. This is such an
important benefit of arbitration because it is understood that the
decision of the tribunal is the final word on the facts and law of
the case before it. This provides a great deal of predictability to
the process. There is no appeal to a superior body, unlike in
domestic court systems, or as in the international context, the
World Trade Organization's Appellate Body.
The balancing of finality with consistency and correctness
hits the wall at this point. Is justice being met when there is no
second opinion on the issues of fact and law of an arbitration?
Are other values, such as correctness and consistency, in conflict
with the benefits of finality? This brings us to the part of the
story involving domestic courts and one of the main arguments
that is being made for the need of an appellate-style review of
investment awards.
For those in the "correctness and consistency" camp,
judicial review is simply an insufficient level of review. There is
evidence, as discussed below, that the NAFTA governments
take this point of view. It appears that they are looking for a
safeguard that provides a high level of consistency, with the
equivalent of a full standard of appellate review. However, if the
intent is that the courts are only permitted a limited scope of
review, as was contemplated in the UNCITRAL Model Law or
the New York Convention, then clearly domestic courts are
entirely appropriate for the task.
The first judicial review of a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral
award occurred in British Columbia in May 2001 with the
review of the final award in the Metalclad Corporation v.
Mexico arbitration. 15 There have subsequently been two further
judicial reviews of the final awards in the Feldman v. Mexico
and S.D. Myers v. Canada arbitrations. All three claims were
14. Thomas Johnson, Presentation, Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty
Awards: Is it Time for an International Appellate System? in ICSID Annulment: Factual
Review, 2(2) Transnational Dispute Management 32 (April 2005).
15. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, Reasons for Judgment (2001)
BCSC 664, also available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Metalclad-
Mexico-BCSCReview-2May200I.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal
of Appellate Practice and Process).
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initially brought under the NAFTA's Chapter 11 provisions. The
latter two judicial review processes were concluded in January
2005 and January 2004, respectively.' 
6
The Metalclad judicial review decision is controversial and
has been the subject of a great amount of discussion and angst in
the Canadian arbitration community. The consensus opinion
about that award is that it was not supportive of arbitration in
Canada. More directly, some criticized Judge Tysoe for saying
the right things in his decision, but failing to apply the law
consistently with the spirit of deference to arbitral awards. He
"talked the talk," but did not "walk the walk."'
17
As a result of the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law
in British Columbia in 1986,18 which was about when most
other provinces in Canada also adopted it, and the New York
Convention, a pro-arbitration policy position was adopted by
Canadian governments, and then subsequently 
by the courts.
Such earlier court decisions as Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon
Steel Corp.20 demonstrated this pro-arbitration position in a very
16. The final judicial review decision in Mexico v. Feldman came down in January
2005. United Mexican States v. Karpa, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/
Feldman-Mexico-OntarioCourtofAppeal-1 1Jan2005.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The lower court decision is available
online at http://www.investmentclaims.con/decisions/Feldman-Mexico-OntarioReview-
3
Dec2003.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process). The Canada v. S.D. Myers judicial review before the Federal Court of Canada
was concluded with the judgment of the court in January 2004. The decision was not
appealed. See http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/SDMyers-Canada-Judicial
Review-13Jan2004.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
17. For example, see the debate between Professor Chip Brower and Christopher
Thomas referred to in Charles H. Brower, II, Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA 's
Investment Chapter, 36 Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 37 (2003), and Charles H. Brower, II,
Beware the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 Colum. J. Transnatl. L. 465 (2002).
18. International Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 233, also available at
http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/lU96233 0l.htm#partl (accessed Nov. 19, 2005; copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
19. There had been, as noted by Yves Fortier, Q.C., a sea change since the adoption of
the UNCITRAL Model Law across Canada, "from doubt to deference in the attitude of
courts toward arbitration." Yves Fortier, Delimiting the Spheres of Judicial and Arbitral
Power: "Beware, My Lord, of Jealousy ", 80 Can. Bar Rev. 143 (2001).
20. In Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 50 B.C.L.R. (2d) 207 (C.A.)
affirming (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 201 (S.C.), Gibbs J.A. (for the Court), relied upon
United States and New Zealand case law in adopting a deferential approach, noting that
"The [International Commercial Arbitration] Act severely circumscribes the jurisdiction of
the Court to interfere with arbitrations to which it applies," and that the grounds
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concrete manner. 2 1 One of the key elements of the adoption of
the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention is
the deference accorded to arbitral awards.
However, a very real concern arose in all three of the
NAFTA judicial review cases with respect to the position of the
Governments of Canada and Mexico on this point of deference.
In each of the cases, strong arguments were made that the courts
should not use the usual standard of review applied to
commercial arbitration awards, and that the courts ought to show
very little deference to the decisions of NAFTA panels.
Arguments advanced by Canada and Mexico indicated a
standard that would have effectively amounted to an appeal of
the arbitral awards rather than a limited judicial review. The
standard of review sought by Canada is referred to in Canadian
administrative law as the pragmatic and functional approach. In
the Metalclad judicial review, Canada argued before Mr. Justice
Tysoe of the British Columbia Trial Division that,
[g]iven the characteristics of NAFTA Chapter Eleven
dispute settlement, and applying the pragmatic and
functional approach, it is clear that in interpreting NAFTA,
Chapter Eleven tribunals should not attract extensive
judicial deference and should not be protected by a high
standard of judicial review.
22
One of the worrisome results of the Metalclad judicial-
review saga was the uncertainty it cast over commercial
empowering courts to set aside such awards are "narrow." Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (holding that "concerns
of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the
resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a
contrary result would be forthcoming in the domestic context") and CBI NZ Ltd. v. Badger
Chiyoda, [1989] 2 N.Z.L.R. 669, 687 (C.A.) (Richardson J.) (noting that "the trend in
international commercial arbitrations is clearly towards giving greater emphasis to party
autonomy and contracting judicial control over the legal content of the reference and the
award.")).
2 1. Other decisions cited on the same point in Canada include Corp. Transnacional de
Inversiones, S.A. de C.V. v. STET International, S.p.A. (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 183 (S.C.),
aff'd 49 O.R. (3d) 414 (C.A.); Food Servs. of America, Inc. v. Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd.
(1997), 32 B.C.L.R. (3d) 225 (S.C.).
22. Outline of Argument of Intervenor Attorney General of Canada at 30, United
Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, (2001) BCSC 664, also available at http://www
.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/canada submission-e.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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arbitration in Canada. There was much conjecture in Canada at
the time as to whether the Metalclad judicial review decision
had damaged Canada's reputation as a friendly place of
arbitration.
The judicial review decisions of both of the courts in S.D.
Myers and Feldman have now put those concerns to rest. In
rejecting the challenges of Mexico and Canada, both of the
Canadian courts unambiguously confirmed a high degree of
deference to arbitral awards, including arbitral awards by
investor-state tribunals like those under NAFTA Chapter 11. As
Chilcott J. of the Ontario Superior Court stated in Feldman,
In my view, a high level of deference should be accorded to
the Tribunal, especially in cases in which the Applicant
Mexico is in reality challenging a finding of fact. The panel
who has heard the evidence is best able to determine issues
of credibility, reliability and onus of proof.
24
He then concluded that he "accept[ed] the proposition that
judicial deference should be accorded to arbitral awards
generally and to international commercial arbitrations in
particular.
25
The S.D. Myers Court also confirmed that it possessed a
limited scope of review when it stated that
[t]he Canadian submission that the Tribunal erred in law in
applying Articles 1102 and 1105 in this case is a matter
outside the Court's authority under Article 34 [of the
Commercial Arbitration Code] to judicially review. A
dispute falling within the terms of the submission to
23. Two NAFTA panels suggested as much. "The Tribunal is troubled by Canada's
submission on this issue in the Metalclad case." UPS v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal
on the Place of Arbitration, Oct. 17, 2001 at 11, also available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/PA oct.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Ruling
Concerning the Investor's Motion to Change the Place of Arbitration, March 14, 2002 at
20, also available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/ruling-investor-
motion.pdf) (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process). The Pope Tribunal indicated that it was "also troubled by Canada's submission
on reviewability and could have reached the same result [as the UPS tribunal] on weighing
Canada's suitability were these proceedings just starting." Id.
24. United Mexican States v. Feldman, Decision, Dec. 3, 2003 (Ontario Superior
Court) at 77, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Feldman-Mexico-Ontario
Review-3Dec2003.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process) ("Feldman").
25. ld. at 97.
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arbitration, even if wrongly decided on a point of fact or
law, cannot be judicially reviewed.
26
One question that is raised by the trio of judicial review
cases before the Canadian courts is: If the standard of review
under the UNCITRAL Model Law was not sufficient to
safeguard the interests of the NAFTA parties, why did they not
originally insert a more robust appellate mechanism when the
NAFTA was drafted? Recent developments confirm that, at least
in the case of the United States, corrective measures are being
taken to address this apparent short-fall.
III: THE UNITED STATES'S SUPPORT FOR AN
APPELLATE MECHANISM
Scholars and practitioners advocating correctness rely on
the rationale that there is a need to legitimize the investor-state
arbitration process by creating greater consistency, predictability
and objectivity. The position taken by the correctness camp
raises a critical question: Is investor-state arbitration
sustainable? 27 The question must be asked in this way because it
involves the United States government. If the United States has
concerns about an international mechanism, such as investment
arbitration, that concern carries a great deal of weight.
Moreover, the reason for this debate about appellate bodies for
investor-state arbitration is largely due to the fact that the US
Congress thinks it is a good idea.28 This is the second main
26. Attorney General of Canada v. S.D. Myers, Inc., Reasons for Order, Jan. 13, 2004
(Fed. Ct.-TD) at 76 (10). The Court also cited in support of this conclusion, id at 42,
Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration
433 (3d ed. Sweet & Maxwell 1999):
[T]here is no provision in the Model Law for any form of appeal from an arbitral
award, on the law or on the facts, or for any judicial review of an award on its
merits. If the tribunal has jurisdiction, the correct procedures are followed and
the correct formalities are observed, the award-good, bad or indifferent-is
final and binding on the parties.
27. Doak Bishop, The Case for an Appellate Panel and Its Scope of Review, 2
Transnatl. Dispute Mgt. 8 (April 2005).
28. On August 6, 2002, President George W. Bush agreed to what is called trade
promotion authority (or TPA) when he signed into law the Trade Act of 2002, P.L. 107-
210; the full text is available through GPO Access at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?lPaddress= 162.140.64.88&filename=publ210.107&directory=/diskc/wais/da
ta/107_congpubliclaws (accessed Dec. 21, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process). In particular, TPA Section 2102(b)(3)(G)(iv) instructs the US Trade
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motivating factor behind the push for an investor-state appellate
mechanism.
The idea of international entities having superior
jurisdiction over the United States is one that is anathema to
many of its political decisionmakers. Look at the example of the
refusal by the United States to participate in the International
Criminal Court, for example. BIT provisions, like those of
NAFTA Chapter 11, are seen by many as an affront to US
sovereignty. An appellate mechanism is regarded as a means to
rein in wild arbitral decisions that may not be in the United
States's best interests. As the United States has yet to lose a
NAFTA or BIT case, it may be difficult to understand the
underlying basis of this concern. Moreover, the Tribunal
members appointed to these arbitrations have been of the highest
calibre.
The Loewen v. US NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration, with
its challenge of what is uniformly agreed to be an appalling
decision by a Mississippi court, has been viewed as one of the
key wake-up calls to the potential dangers of international
investment arbitrations to United States sovereignty. The mere
idea that a United States court could be reviewed in some
manner by a international arbitral panel is considered
incendiary. Even the Loewen Tribunal, in its Final Award,
sounded a note of caution about the dangers to the sustainability
of the NAFTA if it made an award against the United States:
As we have sought to make clear, we find nothing in
NAFTA to justify the exercise by this Tribunal of an
appellate function parallel to that which belongs to the
Representative to "[establish] a single body to review decisions in investor-to-government
disputes."
29. For example, see Public Citizen's extensive treatment of NAFTA Chapter 11:
NAFTA's Threat to Sovereignty and Democracy: The Record of NAFTA Chapter 11
Investor-State Cases 1994-2005, http://www.citizen.org/documents/Chapter/
2 0 11 %20
Report%20Final.pdf (accessed Nov. 19, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
30. The Loewen Group, Inc. & Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, Final Award
(ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3 (NAFTA), also available at http://www.investmentclaims
.com/decisions/Loewen-US-Award-26Jun
20 0 3 .pdf) (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter Loewen]. A full set of the
pleadings and awards in the Loewen arbitration can be found at http://www.naftaclaims
.com/disputes us 5.htm (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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courts of the host nation. In the last resort, a failure by that
nation to provide adequate means of remedy may amount
to an international wrong but only in the last resort. The
line may be hard to draw, but it is real. Too great a
readiness to step from outside into the domestic arena,
attributing the shape of an international wrong to what is
really a local error (however serious), will damage both the
integrity of the domestic judicial system and the viability of
NAFTA itself. The natural instinct, when someone
observes a miscarriage of justice, is to step in and try to put
it right, but the interests of the international investing
community demand that we must observe the principles
which we have been appointed to apply, and stay our
hands.
3 1
However, the United States won the Loewen case. Perhaps,
if the United States had lost, an appellate mechanism, if it had
upheld the decision, would have provided more legitimacy to
such a challenge to a United States court and thus aided in
preserving the sustainability of the NAFTA. But if the basic
issue is that of American distaste to the application of foreign
jurisdiction, then surely an appellate review by yet another
international tribunal would be no more satisfying for those
worried about infringements of state sovereignty.
The end result of these types of concerns has been the
inclusion of provisions in a number of recent United States
investment treaties requiring the creation of an appellate body.
For example, the October 2004 US-Uruguay BIT states in
Annex "E" that
[w]ithin three years after the date of entry into force of this
Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a
bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review
awards rendered under Article 34 in arbitrations
commenced after they establish the appellate body or
similar mechanism.
32
31. Loewen at 242.
32. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Uruguay
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (Oct. 25, 2004),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/WorldRegions/Americas/SouthAmerica/Uruguay
_BIT/assetupload file583_6728.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process). Similar provisions can also be found in the recent Free
Trade Agreements negotiated with Chile, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade
Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html (accessed Jan. 26, 2006;
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In direct response to the actions of the United States, the
World Bank's ICSID, a prominent international-investment
arbitration institution, published a discussion paper titled
Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration
in October 2004 which sought to kick-start the creation of an
appeals facility to be administered at the ICSID.33 As noted in
that paper, by mid-2005 as many as twenty countries may have
signed treaties with provisions on an appeal mechanism. The
main justification mentioned in the ICSID paper for an appeals
mechanism is to foster coherence and consistency in the case
law emerging under investment treaties.34 If there are to be
appeals, then the suggestion of a single appeal mechanism,
administered by the ICSID, makes a great deal of sense.
The impetus for the creation of such a mechanism
administered by the ICSID seems to have slowed with the
publication in June 2005 of a further working paper titled
"Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations."
35 In
this latest paper, the ICSID confirms that it will continue to
work on the development of an appellate body concept, but that
"it would be premature to attempt to establish such an ICSID
mechanism at this stage, particularly in view of the difficult
technical and policy issues raised in the Discussion Paper."
36
IV. KEY ISSUES 1N THE CREATION OF AN APPELLATE
MECHANISM
The foregoing discussion addressed the factors driving the
creation of an appellate mechanism in investor-state arbitration.
Such a discussion would not be complete without exploring
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process), and Singapore, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/Final-Texts/Section-Ind
ex.html) (accessed Jan. 26, 2006; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
33. Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, ICSID Working
Paper #1 (Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/improve-arb.pdf
(accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
34. Id. at 2 1.
35. Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, ICSID Working Paper #2
(May 12, 2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/052405-sgmanual.pdf
(accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
36. Id. at 14.
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some of the key issues that must be addressed in determining
whether an appellate mechanism is desirable.
37
Clearly, if you add another entire full appeals step to the
overall arbitration process, the finality benefit of arbitration is
severely undermined. In particular, arbitrations will become
much longer and more expensive, and the risks of an adverse
decision to the claimant will dramatically increase. The benefit
of lengthening the process will go to large, well-resourced
governments and corporations. Thus, claims by smaller
investors, and defences by developing38 countries, will
correspondingly become much more difficult.
To mitigate some of these problems associated with
lengthening the process, at a minimum it would be necessary to
move away from an ad hoc arbitral format, in which the
disputing parties cover the costs of the panels, to an institutional
format with permanent members. This does not eliminate extra
attorney costs, which tend to be the largest expense in
arbitration, but does alleviate some of the overall increased
costs. Moreover, to avoid additional expense and duplication,
the judicial review process would have to be folded into any
new appeal process.
The question of precedent also becomes an important
factor. For there to be true consistency between arbitral awards,
one might expect that some formal system of precedence may
have to be adopted, otherwise the goal of consistency would be
difficult to achieve. However, the danger of inconsistent
decisions is a facet of any legal system. National courts have a
system of binding precedent; yet, as a reasonable observer must
admit, they are not immune from contradictory decisions. In
investor-state arbitration each case is considered to be unique.
Many treaties have provisions stating that there is no precedent
37. Some concerns raised include: (1) Should there be a standing body? (2) Would
multiple appellate bodies be needed so there could be one for each treaty? (3) Who would
pay for it? (4) What would be the standard of review? and (5) Who will appoint members?
Doak Bishop envisages a single appellate body which would review issues of jurisdiction
and admissibility, fundamental errors of procedure, due process issues that are
encompassed in the ICSID and New York Conventions, and errors of law. Bishop, supra n.
27, at 8-12.
38. See Thomas Walde, Alternatives for Obtaining Greater Consistency in Investment
Arbitration: An Appellate Institution after the WTO, Authoritative Treaty Arbitration or
Mandatory Consolidation? 2 Transnatl. Dispute Mgt. 71 (April 2005).
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or binding effect between arbitral awards.39 Although arbitral
awards are not considered binding precedent, they are certainly
viewed by arbitrators as being persuasive authority. Soft
precedent in some form or another already exists in investor-
state arbitration, whereby decisions are widely available,n° and
arbitral panels closely consider and sometimes adopt the
reasoning of other tribunals. For those who are concerned about
consistency, there appears to be a good argument that such
consistency is already developing in investor-state arbitration.
If consistency is truly an overriding objective, then perhaps
a closer examination of other types of provisions tailored to
deter or address the dangers of parallel proceedings and the
possibility of overlapping damages awards4 ' is warranted. For
example, procedures for the consolidation of claims, fork-in-the
road provisions or lis pendans and res judicata, may be more
effective approaches to address inconsistency than the creation
of an appellate mechanism.
42
There have also been recent decisions in a number of BIT
arbitrations raising concerns about the dangers of inconsistency
in decisionmaking. For example, in the now notorious CME and
Lauder BIT arbitrations against the Czech Republic, 43 many
39. "An award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the
disputing parties and in respect of a particular case." NAFTA Article 1136, available at
http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/indexe.aspx?DetaillD= 61#A 1136 (accessed
Nov. 19, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). This is similar
to Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: "The decision of the Court
has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
United Nations & International Court of Justice, Charter of the United Nations and Statute
of the International Court of Justice (United Nations 1968), also available at http:www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetext/istatute.htm (accessed Nov. 19, 2005; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
40. They are, for example, available through publicly available web sources such as
http://www.investmentclaims.com and http://www.naftaclaims.com.
41. See, for example, the discussion concerning the SGS cases against the Philippines
and Pakistan: Emmanuel Gaillard, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction Over
Contract Claims-The SGS Cases Considered, in International Investment Law and
Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary
International Law 325 (Todd Weiler, ed., Cameron 2005) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
42. In some of the Argentina BIT arbitrations, for example, one solution employed by
the ICSID to avoid duplication of effort has been to have arbitrators sit on more than one
panel where there are overlapping facts and issues.
43. CME Czech Republic B. V. v. Czech Republic. Foma; Award. <arcj 14. 2003
(UNCITRAL, Netherlands/Czech Republic BIT), also available at http://www.investrnent
claims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-FinalAward-14Mar2003.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005;
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
have seen the decisions by the two panels as an example of the
need for an appellate body. In those cases, Mr. Lauder, the
controlling shareholder of CME, brought a separate and personal
arbitration claim under another treaty against the Czech
Republic, while at the same time CME brought its claim. The
facts and law underlying the two arbitrations were essentially
identical, with the main differences being that the arbitrations
were under different treaties brought by different, if related,
claimants. While Mr. Lauder lost his arbitration, CME won
handsomely against the Czechs. Would an appellate body really
have made a difference? Would investment law have been more
consistent if both those arbitrations had been appealed?
The answer in both cases is that there is no guarantee that
an appellate review would have improved the result. The
problem with the CME and Lauder cases is that the claims
should have been consolidated into a single arbitration. If the
two cases had been brought under the NAFTA, for example, this
exact scenario could have been addressed under the NAFTA
consolidation provisions.44 In fact, the claimants in both
arbitrations proposed consolidation of their claims to the
Respondent, the Czech Republic, but were rejected.
Hypothetically speaking, even if a multilateral appellate body
had existed, applicable to both arbitrations such that a single
panel could have reviewed both decisions, there is no guarantee
that the appellate tribunal would necessarily have made a better
or different decision in either case. High level appeals can be
inconsistent as well.
In the final result, it appears to be rather premature, and
perhaps alarmist, to suggest that the present model is broken on
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process); Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech
Republic, Final Award, Sept. 3, 2001 (UNCITRAL, United States/Czech Republic BIT),
also available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Lauder-Czech-FinalAward-3
Sept200l.pdf (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
44. NAFTA Article 1126(2) provides:
Where a Tribunal established under this Article is satisfied that claims have been
submitted to arbitration under Article 1120 that have a question of law or fact in
common, the Tribunal may, in the interests of fair and efficient resolution of the
claims, and after hearing the disputing parties, by order: (a) assume jurisdiction
over, and hear and determine together, all or part of the claims.
Available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index e.aspxDetailID=161#All
26 (accessed Nov. 17, 2005; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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the basis of consistency. Despite the lack of formal stare decisis,
the system of soft precedent has actually resulted in consistency
amongst the tribunal decisions. One need only to look at the
recent jurisdiction awards rendered by the various tribunals
involved in BIT claims against Argentina to see that there has
actually been a high degree of consistency.
45
When addressing the question of correctness, the standard
of review of any review mechanism becomes a critical factor.
The standard of review can be placed on a continuum with the
limited review incorporated into judicial review under the
UNCITRAL Model Law or New York Convention on one end
of the scale, and full appeal on fact and law, with the right of the
court to substitute its decision, on the other end of the spectrum.
The further along the scale towards an appeal, the more onerous
(and costly) the review process becomes.
This raises the question of deference: When we look at the
development of investor-state arbitration, can we confidently say
that the awards made up to this point have required correction?
One's view frequently depends on whether one is on the losing
side of an award. The quality of the arbitrators and the awards in
these arbitrations has been extraordinarily high. However, there
have been some rumblings, mostly by anti-free trade NGO's and
governments on the losing side of certain issues, that these
tribunals have been inadequate to the task. A review of these
critiques exposes them as being more rhetorical fodder by
activists rather than genuine criticisms about the quality of the
decisions.
One element of any appeal system is the "unarticulated
assumption" that senior practitioners are required to play the
role of overseers to provide that sober second thought needed to
maintain consistency in decisionmaking. 46 Short of perhaps a
review by the International Court of Justice, who could provide
a second decision that would be in a better position than the
tribunals we have already seen? One of the reasons that the
principle of finality appears to have worked in investor-state
45. For a discussion of the Argentina cases with respect to the particular issue of
shareholder rights, see Ian Laird, A Community of Destiny-The Barcelona Traction Case
and the Development of Shareholder Rights to Bring Investment Claims, in Leading Cases
77, supra n. 41.
46. Lauterpacht makes a similar point. See Lauterpacht, supra n. 6, at I11.
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arbitrations is because of the high quality of the arbitrators. We
have a situation here in which one must ask whether it is
necessary to fix something that is still developing, and that
appears not to be broken.
V. CONCLUSION
Is an appellate mechanism required in investor-state
arbitration for it to be viable? It would seem that it is too early to
make a final determination on this question. After much initial
enthusiasm, even the ICSID itself now appears to be taking a
"go-slow" approach. Perhaps, as we examine the issue more
closely, the objectives of finality and correctness will appear less
contradictory. With high-quality arbitrators in the first instance,
correctness then becomes less of an issue and finality remains
workable. However, in the case of the United States, the
movement towards some form of new appeal mechanism seems
inexorable. Negotiations are proceeding as to the scope of these
mechanisms. Whether correctness and consistency become
preferred over finality remains to be determined.
